Under 5, the State remained free to seek a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia notwithstanding the Attorney General's objection. 5 See Richmond v. J. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. 364 U. S., at 341. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. That duty, however, is not violated when the majority acts to facilitate the election of a member of a group that lacks such power because it remains underrepresented in the state legislature - whether that group is defined by political affiliation, by common economic interests, or by religious, ethnic, or racial characteristics. Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. 92-357. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose V s. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. See Richmond v. J. Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing"?, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. Gomillion is consistent with this view. Id., at 472-473. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. It is true, of course, that one's vote may be more or less effective depending on the interests of the other individuals who are in one's district, and our cases recognize the reality that members of the same race often have shared interests. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. Again, however, the equal protection inquiry should look at the group's overall influence over, and treatment by, elected representatives and the political process as a whole. The new district stretches approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 and, for much of its length, is no wider than the 1-85 corridor. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. Limited by its own terms to cases involving unusually shaped districts, the Court's approach nonetheless will unnecessarily hinder to some extent a State's voluntary effort to ensure a modicum of minority representation. Petitioner Argument (Shaw) 1. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). What was Justice Blackmun's dissent opinion? The District Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants' claim. v. Bakke, supra, at 305 (opinion of Powell, J.). 3. the latter two of these three conditions depend on proving that what the Court today brands as "impermissible racial stereotypes," ante, at 647, are true. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Gomillion, in short, the group that formed the majority at the state level purportedly set out to manipulate city boundaries in order to remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal services. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. North Carolina's initial reapportionment effort included one district purposefully constructed to have a majority of black voters. 642-649. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Thus, we express no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more," always gives rise to an equal protection claim. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. Appellants point out that blacks currently hold the positions of State Auditor, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. 442 U. S., at 272. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. To help you find the subject, ask, Who answered? See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. Appellee Reno . Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." Appellants are five residents of Dur-. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647-648, and by a "threa[t] to our system of representative democracy," ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 2 also provides that a violation of that prohibition "is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected] class in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Majority Opinion/Decision. Statement, O. T. 1991, No. Cf. a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. Argued April 20, 1993-Decided June 28,1993. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. The First District was somewhat hook-shaped, beginning in the northeastern part of the state and tapering down with fingerlike extensions almost to the South Carolina border. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. And when race is used to supplant seniority in layoffs, someone is laid off who would not be otherwise. Voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages the creation of districts with majorities of minority voters. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. Media. UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution. of Oral Arg. It may therefore be that few electoral districting cases are ever likely to employ the strict scrutiny the Court holds to be applicable on remand if appellants' allegations are "not contradicted." Connor, supra, at 425. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . 2. See, e.g.,Rogers v. Lodge(1982);White v. Regester(1973). For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Moreover, a group's power to affect the political process does not automatically dissipate by virtue of an electoral loss. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. Not very long ago, of course, it was argued that minority groups defined by race were the only groups the Equal Protection Clause protected in this context. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Ante, at 646 (emphasis in original). Statement 102a. Though they might be dissatisfied at the prospect of casting a vote for a losing candidate-a lot shared by many, including a disproportionate number of minor-, its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing a poll tax [and] a literacy test. I summed up my views on this matter in the plurality opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986).3 Because districting inevitably is the expression of interest group politics, and because "the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections," id., at 132. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. Because appellants here stated such a claim, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. 808 F. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Byron R. White White. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). 21-24 (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing "grotesque gerrymandering" and "unusual shapes" drawn solely to deprive Democratic voters of electoral power). v. RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. As explained below, that position cannot be squared with the one taken by the majority in this case. Constitutional Principle. 439, as amended, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, the General Assembly passed new legislation creating a second majority-black district. plan did not minimize or unfairly cancel out white voting strength." The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." The most compelling evidence of the Court's position prior to this day, for it is most directly on point, is UJO, 430 U. S. 144 (1977). or What? of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 (plurality opinion). This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. Wygant, supra, at 295 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment). 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995). In addition, nothing in the Court's decisions compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to the same constitutional scrutiny; in fact, this country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting and the Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. 1994), probable jurisdiction noted 115 . 9 As has been remarked, "[d]ragons, bacon strips, dumbbells and other strained shapes are not always reliable signs that partisan (or racial or ethnic or factional) interests are being served, while the most regularly drawn district may turn out to have been skillfully constructed with an intent to aid one party." It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. Although the statute that redrew the city limits of Tuskegee was race neutral on its face, plaintiffs alleged that its effect was impermissibly to remove from the city virtually all black voters and no white voters. See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Appellants contended that the General Assembly's revised reapportionment plan violated several provisions of the United States Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. The Equal Protection Clause is only violated when a law seeks to hurt a minority group in voting.t. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. and by him referred to the Court in No. Nevertheless, there was no fencing out of the white population from participation in the political processes of the county, and the. As a majority of the Justices construed the complaint, the UJO plaintiffs made a different claim: that the New York plan impermissibly "diluted" their voting strength. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. 1973). It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme. In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on. That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense. 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